3. 法律の背景 27/156
日本の戦争犯罪2

3. 法律の背景 27/156
日本の戦争犯罪3

4. IWGとその機能の概要41/156

6. 調査結果大成功と政策提言 93/156
調査結果 3:

序文とお詫び。がっかりした人の中には、日本の戦争犯罪に関する米国の記録が大量に公開されることを望んでいた人々

3. 法律の背景 27/156

日本の戦争犯罪

3. 法律の背景 27/156

調査背景と調査内容

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4. IWGとその機能の概要41/156

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6. 調査結果と政策提言 93/156

調査結果 3:




IWG Report2007

Preface

Whatever our successes, any enterprise as ambitious and untested as the one undertaken by the IWG is certain to have its disappointments. Among the disappointed will be those who had hoped for a voluminous release of U.S. records relating to Japanese war crimes.

My understanding of the depth of feeling surrounding this issue changed dramatically in 2001, when I spoke to a meeting of the Global Alliance for Preserving the History of World War II in Asia. The Global Alliance is a federation of organizations and individuals from many different countries who share a single goal: to tell the world about the horrors that took place in Asia in conjunction with the occupation forces of the Japanese Imperial Government.

Until my conversations during that meeting with many committed individuals from the United States, Canada, China, Korea, the Philippines, Japan, and elsewhere, I did not fully appreciate the concern of millions of survivors and their families, friends, and associates that this story is virtually untold.

Many people around the world had hoped that the IWG would unearth records that would help them document Japanese atrocities. To these people, I state unequivocally that the IWG was diligent and thorough in its search for relevant records about war crimes in Asia.

The IWG uncovered and released few Asian theatre records because few such U.S. records remained classified. Unclassified records were not under IWG jurisdiction. To address any concerns that may arise relating to the dearth of documents released under the JIGDA, we refer readers to publications that document the capture, exploitation, and return of Jap , exploitation, and return of Japanese records from World War II.2





序文

私たちの成功がどうであれ、IWG のような野心的でテストされていない事業は、確実に失望します。

がっかりした人の中には、日本の戦争犯罪に関する米国の記録が大量に公開されることを望んでいた人々もいるだろう。

この問題をめぐる感情の深さについての私の理解は、2001 年にアジアで第二次世界大戦の歴史を保存するためのグローバル アライアンスの会議で話したときに劇的に変わりました。

グローバル アライアンスは、日本帝国政府の占領軍と協力してアジアで起こった恐怖を世界に伝えるという 1 つの目標を共有する、さまざまな国の組織と個人の連合体です。

米国、カナダ、中国、韓国、フィリピン、日本などの多くの献身的な個人との会合での会話まで、私は何百万人もの生存者とその家族、友人、仲間の懸念を十分に理解していませんでした。

話はほとんど語られていません。

世界中の多くの人々が、IWG が日本の残虐行為を文書化するのに役立つ記録を発掘することを望んでいました。 これらの人々に対して、私は IWG がアジアにおける戦争犯罪に関する関連記録を熱心かつ徹底的に調査したことを明確に述べます。

IWG は、アジアの劇場の記録をほとんど発見して公開しませんでした。 未分類の記録は IWG の管轄下にありませんでした。

JIGDA の下で公開された文書の不足に関連して発生する可能性のある懸念に対処するために、私たちは読者にジャップの捕獲、搾取、および返還を文書化した出版物を紹介します。

第二次世界大戦からの日本の記録の、利用、および返還.2

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xiii NARA archivists attest that the real problem with Japanese documents from World War II is not that they are few in number, but that they are largely underused by researchers. To encourage the full review of these records, the IWG published Researching Japanese War Crimes:

Introductory Essays. 3 With this volume, we hope to expose the interested public to the breadth of previously declassified or unclassified records within the National Archives that bear on these subjects and that remain to be fully exploited by scholars, journalists, and other researchers. Further, Researching Japanese War Crimes outlines the current level and nature of English and Japanese language scholarship that pertains to the subject of Japanese Imperial Government war crimes. Finally, it discusses the reasons why the volume and specificity of records about Asian war crimes is much smaller than records of Nazi war crimes. The book is accompanied by a searchable CD-ROM of a 1,700-page finding aid to these NARA records, as well as a smaller finding aid to select Japanese War Crimes records. We are confident that records exist that will present in time a very clear picture of the scope and horrors of war crimes in Asia before and during World War II. We very much hope that Researching Japanese War Crimes will spur the research and scholarship necessary to achieve this end. *** The IWG leaves a vast product and several important legacies. These came about only because of our extreme good fortune in bringing together the talent, hard work, and commitment of so many individuals, many of whose names are not even specifically revealed in these pages. Each of those mentioned or unmentioned was a sine qua non to the accomplishments of the IWG. First, we must recognize the extraordinary

First, we must recognize the extraordinary personal and professional contribution and commitment of Senator Mike DeWine and Member of Congress Carolyn Maloney. They were our congressional champions from day one and throughout our entire existence. They and their most competent and committed staff members were always there for the IWG. On behalf of the American people, we thank you. What can I say about our three public members, Elizabeth Holtzman, Tom Baer, and Richard BenVeniste? Their commitment, their refusal to relent, their forthrightness are unlike anything I have ever experienced elsewhere. I can only hope that in their continuing pursuits they take a moment to step back and take pleasure in the fruits of their labor. Unlike IWG government members, who implemented the acts as an additional part of their regular duties, the three public members selflessly devoted hour upon hour of their lives to understanding the nuances of

1. Introduction

In October 1998, President Clinton signed into law the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act (NWCDA), which required the U.S. Government to locate, declassify, and release in their entirety, with few exceptions, remaining classified records about war crimes committed by Nazi Germany and its allies. The act required the President to establish an Interagency Working Group to oversee its implementation. The IWG consists of high-level officials of seven key Executive Branch agencies (who designated representatives), and three public members appointed by the President (see figure 1). The act charged the IWG to "take such actions as necessary to expedite the release of such records to the public" and to report the outcome to Congress. Although the NWCDA covered records related to all of Germany's allies, the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act of 2000 (JIGDA) made explicit the Government's responsibility to open its remaining classified records on Japanese 1. Introduction Figure 1. IWG Participants Chair Allen Weinstein, Archivist of the United States Public Members Thomas H. Baer, Los Angeles, New York, 1999-2007 Richard Ben-Veniste, Washington, DC, 1999-2007 Elizabeth Holtzman, New York, 1999-2007 Agency Participants Stewart Aly, Office of the Secretary of Defense John Collingwood, Federal Bureau of Investigation David Holmes, Central Intelligence Agency William Leary, National Security Council David Marwell, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Eli Rosenbaum, Department of Justice, Office of Special Investigations William Slany, Department of State war crimes. The JIGDA provided for a fourth public member, who was not appointed. In January 2004, Congress extended the JIGDA for one year to provide additional time for the CIA to comply with the law with respect to both Japanese and Nazi war crimes records. In February 2005, the Congress again extended the act until 2007 at the urging of the IWG public members, who viewed the task as yet unfinished primarily because of the reluctance of the CIA to release all its records on suspect individuals used as intelligence assets during the Cold War.

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The records related to Japanese war crimes required a different sort of interpretive task to account for the relative paucity of records remaining classified and yet to show that a wealth of documentation exists relating to the subject. To address these issues, the IWG published Researching Japanese War Crimes: Introductory Essays. 8 This book was accompanied by a CD containing two finding aids to these records: Japanese War Crimes and Related Topics and Select Documents on Japanese War Crimes. 9

2. The Nature of War Crimes Records　　21/156

Nazi War Crimes Records In 1943, the Allies established the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) to investigate war crimes committed by the Axis powers and to advise the Allied governments on the legal processes for bringing war criminals to justice. To assist the UNWCC and Allied governments in finding suspected war criminals in Europe, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force established a Central Registry of War Criminals and Security Suspects (CROWCASS) in the spring of 1945. CROWCASS collected information on individuals wanted on war crimes charges, and it published lists of suspects for use by the UNWCC and Allied countries. In its three years of operation, CROWCASS issued or processed over 200,000 reports on suspects 2. The Nature of War Crimes Records 10. United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the UNWCC and the Development of the Laws of War (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), 379. UNWCC records are held by the United Nations in New York and are not subject to the Disclosure Acts, but Commission records appear throughout U.S. holdings of war crimes and diplomatic records. The United Nations opened its UNWCC files to researchers in 1987 in the wake of disclosure that one UNWCC file pertained to former UN Secretary Kurt Waldheim. 11. Ian Sayer and Douglass Botting, America's Secret Army (London: Grafton Books, 1989), 294. IWG Final Report to Congress for use by investigators, and it published voluminous lists of people sought for crimes against humanity.10 The U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) bore the greatest responsibility for identifying and apprehending these suspects in the U.S. occupation zones. The Army CIC captured some 120,000 Germans listed for automatic arrest, including SS, Gestapo, and Nazi Party leaders.11 Immediately at the end of World War II in Germany, the Allies established the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, which rendered its judgment on 21 top officials and six organizations of the Third Reich on October 1, 1946. The United States later tried 177 major criminals in subsequent proceedings at Nuremberg. In addition, the fourpower Control Council for Germany authorized each of the Allied powers to hold trials in its zone of occupation. The United States tried 1,700 German and other Axis nationals at Dachau for concentration camp crimes, and it extradited numerous suspects to



Japanese War Crimes Records23/156

Japanese War Crimes Records As with the Nazi trials, each of the Japanese war crimes trials occasioned the collection and preparation of large bodies of records. Prosecutors combed captured and American records, secured affidavits and statements, and produced court submissions and background materials that resulted in a significant and voluminous war crimes archive. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (known as the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal) began in May 1946. There were 28 Class A defendants from a cross-section of senior Japanese officials, including generals, admirals, career diplomats, and bureaucrats. Most prominent among them were Hideki Tojo, Prime Minister of Japan through most of the war, and wartime foreign ministers Koki Hirota (a former premier), Mamoru Shigemitsu, and Shigenori Togo. Class A defendants were charged with three categories of offenses: conspiracy to commit aggression, aggression, and conventional war crimes. The prosecution produced more than 400 witnesses, almost 800 witness affidavits, and more than 4,000 other documents.14 Additional tribunals that sat outside of Tokyo judged over 5,500 individuals in more than 2,200 trials. These Class B and C war criminals were charged with committing atrocities during battle, during occupation, or against prisoners of war. Some of these trials were held in Yokohama and others were convened throughout the former theater of war.15 General MacArthur's hastily organized trials in Manila, the first war crimes trials in the Far East, found Japanese generals Tomoyuki Yamashita and Masaharu Homma guilty, and both were executed. In Shanghai, American tribunals were also held for Japanese soldiers who participated in the trial and execution of American pilots under the "Enemy Airmen's Act," promulgated by the Japanese after the Doolittle raid on Japan in April 1942, as well as for personnel at POW camps in China who abused prisoners. The U.S. Navy held trials for war crimes committed in the Pacific. Many of these proceedings involved close cooperation with British, Australian, and Dutch authorities. Once the trial records had served their administrative and legal purposes, they were transferred to the National Archives.16 The records of other nations' war crimes trials are

The records of other nations' war crimes trials are not subject to the Disclosure Acts because they were never in the possession of the U.S. Government. For instance, the Nationalist Chinese Government's trials

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of Japanese war criminals held in Nanjing did not result in American records despite the heinousness and notoriety of the war crimes committed there by the Japanese. In its canvass of records possibly useful for war crimes information, the IWG looked closely at the history and disposition of a large body of captured Japanese records. The IWG was concerned that valuable war crimes information may have been lost with the return of the records to Japan in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Many captured Japanese records were used in court exhibits and otherwise integrated into the war crimes records in the United States. Army Judge Advocate General records relating to the Far East trials consist of more than 400,000 pages. Most of these records were never security classified, and those that were had been declassified by 1982. Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) Legal Section records involving war crimes trials throughout the Pacific region comprise some 1.5 million pages of documentation and include many captured Japanese records. Most of these records were also never security classified, and the rest were declassified by 1982. In addition, the military had collected and shipped to the United States for intelligence exploitation over 7,000 cubic feet of captured records that eventually came under the control of the CIA. After the CIA and other interested agencies finished exploiting these records, they were returned to Japan beginning in 1958. The return was consistent with international practice and carried out in the name of normalization of diplomatic relations. The IWG staff inquired closely into the matter to determine whether war crimes records had indeed been returned. The staff found

no evidence that the records were war-crimes related; instead, they consisted largely of diplomatic records from the 1920s and earlier, technical records related to military matters, and naval oceanographic

The National Archives staff produced three documents concerning declassified Japanese war crimes documents. The first is a 1,700-page archival guide, or finding aid, to Japanese World War II war crimes records in NARA holdings, including newly released records. The second is a finding aid focused on Japanese biological warfare. The third, Researching Japanese War Crimes: Introductory Essays, is a book undertaken in response to concern about the alleged loss of war crimes information and the underuse of available documentation. It addresses starting points for engaging in war crimes research and also contains the first full explanation of how captured documents were thoroughly exploited for military and intelligence uses as well as their use for war crimes investigations.17 The third, Researching Japanese War Crimes: Introductory Essays, is a book undertaken in response to concern about the alleged loss of war crimes information and the underuse of available documentation. It addresses starting points for engaging in war crimes research and also contains the first full explanation of how captured documents were thoroughly exploited for military and intelligence uses as well as their use for war crimes investigations.17

Intelligence Records and Foreign Government Information By 1998, when the f 24/156 Compared with the number of remaining classified records related to Germany, there were far fewer still-classified records about Japan for two reasons. First, the U.S. military-not the OSS-had greater control of most of the Pacific Theater records and could release these documents to the public with more ease than the OSS, which had to consider relationships with foreign governments and intelligence agency policies. As a result, most of these Japan-related records, including wartime intelligence records, were routinely declassified in the 1970s and 1980s by the Army, Navy, and other Department of Defense entities in the course of their regular review programs. Second, there were few still-classified postwar records relating to Japanese war criminals because there was not a continuing hunt for Japanese perpetrators as there was for Nazis, so the CIC, CIA, and FBI did not create dossiers on large numbers of Japanese individuals as possible intelligence assets, suspected spies, or as prospective immigrants. Therefore, by the time the IWG began its work, there were relatively few postwar records related to Japanese war criminals that remained classified. This leaves aside the cases of former Japanese war criminals who, after being convicted and serving their sentences, went on to become high government officials. Releasing these files was problematic for the intelligence agencies, but, finally, was a notab was a notable success for the IWG.　　25/156



3. Background of the Acts　　27/156

Japan Under Scrutiny

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Public interest in Japanese war crimes arose intermittently in the postwar period as the stories of victims received public notice as a result of historical and popular studies and media attention. Books such as the late Sheldon Harris' 1994 Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare 1932-1945 and the American Cover-up and the late Iris Chang's 1997 best seller, The Rape of Nanking, helped give the subject visibility.44 The earliest groups to receive attention were American POWs and civilian internees who made claims under the War Claims Act after its passage in 1948. However, mistreated POWs, sex slaves (the so-called "comfort women"), civilian internees, and forced laborers remained dissatisfied with the extent of compensation-if any-for their suffering.





3. 法律の背景 27/156

精査中の日本

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戦後、日本の戦争犯罪に対する一般の関心は断続的に高まりました。

歴史研究や大衆研究、メディアの注目の結果として、被害者の話が一般に知られるようになったからです。

故シェルドン・ハリスの 1994 年の死の工場: 日本の生物戦争 1932-1945 やアメリカの隠蔽工作、

故アイリス・チャンの 1997 年のベストセラー『南京のレイプ』などの本は、この主題を可視化するのに役立った.44 注目を集めたのは、1948 年に戦争請求法が可決された後、

戦争請求法に基づいて請求を行ったアメリカ人捕虜と民間人抑留者でした。 彼らの苦しみに対する補償の範囲（もしあれば）。



Even more of an irritant to these groups, however, has been the failure of the Japanese Government to apologize fully for its wartime behavior with regard to acts of cruelty such as harsh forced labor, conditions aboard the POW transports known as "hell ships," and the criminal brutality of the Bataan Death March. Victims have repeatedly called for redress, citing as precedent settlements in the late 1990s between victims of Nazi looting and the German Government and Swiss banks. In the 1990s, no fewer than 16 measures dealing with Japanese war crimes were introduced in the Congress in attempts to secure some sort of redress for victims.





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しかし、これらのグループをさらに苛立たせているのは、過酷な強制労働、

「地獄の船」として知られる捕虜輸送船の状況などの残虐行為に関する戦時中の行動について、日本政府が十分に謝罪しなかったことです。

そしてバターン死の行進の犯罪的残虐行為。

被害者は、1990 年代後半にナチスの略奪の被害者とドイツ政府およびスイスの銀行との間で和解が成立したことを前例として挙げ、繰り返し救済を求めてきました。 1990 年代には、被害者への何らかの補償を確保するために、日本の戦争犯罪に対処する 16 以上の措置が議会に導入されました。



45 For instance, in 1997 a joint resolution was introduced in Congress that expressed a number of groups' frustration with the stance of the United States and Japanese governments with respect to Japanese accountability for war crimes committed by Imperial Japan. House Concurrent Resolution 126 sought to express the sense of Congress concerning war crimes committed by the Japanese military during World War II. After listing particular offenses, characterized as "atrocious crimes against humanity," the resolution called on Japan to (1) formally issue a clear and unambiguous apology for the atrocious war crimes committed by the Japanese military during World War II; and (2) immediately pay reparations to the victims of those crimes, including United States military and civilian prisoners of war, people of Guam who were subjected to violence and imprisonment, survivors of the "Rape of Nanjing" from December, 1937, until February, 1938, and the women who were forced into sexual slavery and known "Rape of Nanjing" from December, 1937, until February, 1938, and the women who were forced into sexual slavery and known by the Japanese military as "comfort women.







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(1) 第二次世界大戦中に日本軍が犯した残虐な戦争犯罪に対して、明確かつ明確な謝罪を正式に行うこと。

と (2) 1937 年 12 月から 2 月までの「南京強姦」の生存者、
暴力と投獄の対象となった米国軍人および民間人捕虜、グアムの人々を含む、

これらの犯罪の犠牲者に直ちに賠償金を支払うこと。

1938年、そして性奴隷にされて知られた女性たち

1937 年 12 月から 1938 年 2 月までの「南京強姦」と
、性奴隷にされ、日本軍から「慰安婦」と呼ばれた女性たち。

"46 Although not passed, the resolution recognized the longstanding frustration of victims and registered dissatisfaction with the Government's position that American lawsuits against Japan and Japanese companies over war crimes were precluded by the 1951 Peace Treaty between the United States and Japan, despite side agreements providing Americans with treatment comparable to that of compensated victims in other countries. The movement to call Japan to account stemmed in part from dissatisfaction with perceived postwar leniency toward Japan and Japanese war criminals, a leniency that was part of the effort to get that country firmly in the American camp during the Cold War. By February 2000, more than a dozen class- 37/156 action lawsuits had been filed in the United States against Japanese corporations by former Allied prisoners of war, civilian internees, and Asian slave laborers. Additional suits were filed and in preparation for Japanese courts seeking redress for "comfort women," slave laborers, and other victims of Japanese crimes, all of whom demanded a Japanese apology and compensation from Japanese courts. The Simon Wiesenthal Center lobbied Attorney General Janet Reno and the Pentagon for the release of U.S. documents concerning amnesties granted to Japanese war criminals, including amnesties granted to supervisors of Japan's biological and chemical warfare program in exchange for the data obtained from experiments conducted on humans in the infamous Unit 731, Japan's biological warfare unit. Passage of the Statutes The Senate concurred and President Clinton signed the act into law on October 19, 1996. 39/156 on December 27, 2000, President Clinton provided his understanding that Japanese war crimes-related records already being processed for disclosure under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act would continue to be processed under that act: 39/156 Because of the paucity of remaining classified Japanese war crimes records and the fact that Japanese war crimes-related classified records were already being processed under the NWCDA, the IWG recognized no difference in the treatment of records under the combined acts. In January 2004, Congress extended the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act for one year, until March 2005, and again in February 2005 until March 2007. Both extensions were urged by the IWG public members, who determined that the CIA needed additional time to comply with the law with respect to both Japanese and Nazi war crimes records. The JIGDA was extended, rather than the NWCDA, because the Nazi War Crimes Act had expired in 2002 and all subsequent search and declassification activities, for both the Pacific and European Theaters, were being carried out under the JIGDA.



4. Overview of the IWG and its Functions　　　　41/156

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particular attention to locating any records related to topics of great interest to the public and to historians, particularly materials related to Japanese treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees, including any materials related to forced or slave labor; persecution of and atrocities against civilian populations; development and use of chemical and biological warfare agents, especially the work of General Ishii, medical experimentation on humans, and Unit 731 ; the so-called "comfort women" program-the Japanese systematic enslavement of women of subject populations for sexual purposes





4. IWGとその機能の概要41/156

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一般の人々や歴史家が非常に関心を持っているトピック、特に資料に関連する記録を見つけることに特に注意を払う

日本の捕虜と民間人抑留者の扱いに関連して、

強制労働または奴隷労働に関連する資料を含む。

一般市民に対する迫害と残虐行為。

化学兵器および生物兵器の開発と使用、特に石井将軍の研究、人間に対する医学実験、 そして731部隊

; いわゆる「慰安婦」プログラム - 日本が性的目的のために対象集団の女性を組織的に奴隷化すること

; and the U.S. Government decision after the war not to prosecute the Emperor and certain war criminals. The IWG enjoined agencies to conduct their surveys with the intention of discovering and eventually declassifying as many documents as possible, not merely those that were indisputably required by a narrow interpretation of the law. Search Tools To help agencies ful 47/156 After the attacks of September 11, 2001, law enforcement, intelligence, foreign affairs, and military agencies shifted resources to the war on terrorism and away from implementation of the Disclosure Acts. From the universe of 620 million pages, agencies identified a total of 113 million pages that merited screening for possible relevance. From these, more than 8.5 million pages were identified as containing relevant material and warranting declassification review under the acts. A very large majority was related to Nazi war crimes or war crimes in Europe; only 142,000 pages were related to Japanese war crimes. Making Documents Publicly Accessible　　56/156 The primary finding aid that was developed as a result of the JIGDA, which covers both newly declassified and previously open Japanese war crimes records, is 1,700 pages, yet it cannot be considered exhaustive: no guide to voluminous archival records can be considered to have identified all information on a subject. Another finding aid that focuses on records relating to Japanese biological warfare was also created. Numerous lists, guides, databases, and other finding aids exist for the German-related records, a 57/156 As of March 2007, much of this work is yet to be done. The Archivist of the United States will continue to work with other executive branch agencies to ensure ongoing disclosure of records relevant to the issues of Costs Direct costs for the IWG totaled over $12 million for its lifetime (see table 1). Individual agency costs, estimated to be $17 million, are discussed in chapter 4. Japanese Records 62/156 Since the U.S. military services were the primary agent in the Pacific and Asia during and immediately after the war, OSS and CIA documentation on Japanese war crimes is relatively small. The CIA conducted its searches for Japanese materials in 2001 initially using the 66-page IWG keyword list. It screened approximately 300,000 pages. The CIA declassified and released four Japanese name files and three Japanese subject files, totaling 782 pages. While the IWG had never expected any agency's search to yield as many Japanese-related files as German ones, it nevertheless expected the CIA's search to produce files on individuals of particular interest, who were prominent in the postwar era. The IWG therefore asked the agency to search for documents related to 45 individuals likely to be in its files. These requests concerned individuals who were suspects or convicted war criminals and who later became important leaders in Japanese government, politics, and industry. The IWG assumed that while such postwar files would likely not contain specific war crimes information, they would report on any activities of these former war criminals with U.S. government officials in Japan. The CIA requested that the IWG provide available biographic information (e.g., dateof-birth) on the 45 named individuals to assist in searching their record systems and identifying documents. The IWG staff provided this information in 2003 and the CIA conducted the requisite searches. The CIA delivered an additional seventeen files on prominent Japanese war criminals and suspects in 2005. The files, which are not voluminous and contain notable time gaps between documents, reflect the information available for collection at the time. The CIA has assured the IWG that if any additional material is located, it will be declassified and to NARA. 66/156 February 2005: A Turning Point The Disclosure Acts were extended twice, primarily to persuade the CIA to follow a release policy more aligned with IWG guidance and the implementation practices of other major agencies. In January 2004, Japanese Documents 69/156 The few Army files responsive to the JIGDA were among those that had already been transferred to the National Archives and declassified. The search and review of remaining records took only two weeks. However, a major item of Congressional inquiry remains outstanding and only partially answered by the Army and the Department of Defense. When Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced the act in the Senate, she included in the record portions of a correspondence from Professor Sheldon Harris, the author of Factories of Death, the well-regarded account of Japan's development and use of biological warfare agents, including human experimentation.80 In his letter, Professor Harris recounted his frustration in attempting to gain access to materials at Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah, and Fort Detrick, Maryland, related to medical war crimes. He alleged that at least some of the documentation was subsequently moved or destroyed. The IWG asked the Army and DOD on several occasions to respond to Professor Harris's charges by producing the records in question or by giving an account of their disposition for inclusion in this record. Despite repeated requests between 2001- 2006, the IWG was not provided contact with Army's records managers for Ft. Detrick, nor did Army provide the IWG with a detailed accounting of the transfer, disposal, or destruction of its Japanese biological warfare records sent to Ft. Detrick during the two decades following World War II. The Army did notify the IWG that reference files maintained by its Public Affairs office had been disposed of after Harris' visit and that other open files had been returned to Dugway Proving Grounds. The IWG has received a statement by the Army that it "…did perform several informal inquiries into the matter and found no corroboration of Professor Harris' allegations." Following renewed requests for additional searches, the Army notified the IWG that their searches "uncovered no evidence in support of the charge that documents related to Japanese biological warfare experiments were destroyed at Ft. Detrick. The Army concluded that all permanent records related to Japanese biological warfare experiments were transferred to NARA." (The IWG had to make a formal request to Dugway for electronic copies for its records, as the originals had been sent to the Library of Congress.) Army Compliance with th



6. Findings and Policy Recommendations　　　93/156



The Disclosure Acts cost the American people approximately $30 million, or about $3.50 per page, to locate, declassify, and open government records that were largely over 50 years old.88 Was it worth it? I

Openness itself is not in question. As seen in chapter 3 of this report, lack of openness was a major impetus behind the Disclosure Acts. Congressional dissatisfaction with the responsiveness of U.S. intelligence agencies to questions about their use of Nazi war criminals in postwar intelligence work, and public dissatisfaction with the lack of aggressiveness in prosecuting Japanese war criminals and holding Japan accountable roused suspicion that government cannot be trusted to tell the truth even about events well over a half century past. Some even charge that there is a concerted cover-up in progress. The IWG believes that openness to the maximum extent consistent with national security will ameliorate such suspicions.



6. Findings and Policy Recommendations　　　93/156

Finding 3:

95/156

Finally, the IWG had great success in part because the acts pertained to Nazis, the Holocaust, and Japanese mistreatment of American POWs.





6. 調査結果と政策提言 93/156

調査結果 3:

95/156

最後に、IWG が大きな成功を収めた理由の 1 つは、行為がナチス、ホロコースト、

そしてアメリカ人捕虜に対する日本の虐待。



The Disclosure Acts, (like the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act), touched on topics that spur significant public activism, which agencies do not want turned against them.

Appendix 3